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Abstract
I construct a theory of cultural transmission in which culture acquisition
takes place in two stages, rst in the family where parents transmit their own
culture, and later in society where children are exposed to a wider set of cultural
models. The role of models is to provide information about alternatives. Cultural
variants dier in how strongly they are transmitted in the family and on how
attractive they are to the children's eyes. Attractiveness may depend on the
actual models one can observe. I characterise the long run distribution of variants
using directed trees and show that more visible cultural variants will have larger
shares. Shares are also increasing in attractiveness and in family strength. When
attractiveness is not context specic, variants competing with a wider set of
variants, everything else equal, will have larger shares provided that copying
is bidirectional. Expanding the set of models does not necessarily lead to an
increase in shares.
JEL classication: D10, I20, J13.
Keywords: Cultural transmission, role models, learning.
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1 Introduction
Marie Curie, Zidane, Obama..., are often mentioned as role models. The female scientist
who reached the top, the immigrant who made it in his new country and became a symbol of
a multicultural society, the rst African American President in US history. Characters that
kick open a door in the minds of children.
\Models" are \actual" examples, their role to provide information about possibilities, to
make children aware of alternatives which could be unknown until then or thought to be
beyond reach. The set of \models" include not only celebrities like those mentioned above,
but also peers, friends, teachers and other gures whose achievements and/or characteristics
exert an inuence on others' decisions. A striking example is that of Jeetendra Prasad,
the rst person from Patwatoli in Bihar (India) to be admitted in an IIT (Indian Institute
of Technology). He got into the IIT in 1991 and in 1997 joined PriceWaterhouseCoopers
in New Jersey. Patwatoli is the home of the Patwa (weaver) community, an impoverished
village which could be \expected to breed Naxalites rather than engineer graduates" (Varma
(2004)). By 2002 already 22 boys from there had passed the admission exams for the IIT's,
and three times as many were looking forward to joining other engineering institutes. All
came from poor families but Prasad's success story \created a dream, and the children of poor
weavers on the boondocks of Bihar were willing to chase it" (Varma (2004)). The success of
El Sistema,1 a music teaching program, which has rescued thousands of Venezuelan children
from a likely environment of drug abuse and crime, can be explained with the same basic
mechanisms.
In spite of the growing interest of economist on the process of cultural transmission there is
no economic theory incorporating the role of models as carriers of information. To contribute
to ll this gap I propose a theory of cultural transmission in which children learn both from
their parents and from models.
I assume that children are educated rst in the family, where they acquire (provisionally) a
variant of a cultural trait, and later in a wider world where they learn about new possibilities.
A family is characterised by its variant and by the set of models its children are exposed to. A
set of models is like a menu from which children may choose, dierent families oering dierent
dishes. And, as it happens with menus, the values attached to the dierent alternatives
depends not only on the actual set of options but also on one's family's (culinary) culture.
Cultural variants dier in two aspects: i) on how permanent or dicult to change they are
and ii) on their attractiveness to the children's eyes. Children form their own views about the
worth of each of the alternatives in their set of models, assign values to them and emulate each
of the models with a probability which is proportional to those values. After this second stage,
1La Fundacion del Estado para el Sistema Nacional de las Orquestas Juveniles e Infantiles de
Venezuela was founded in 1975 by Juan Antonio Abreu, economist and musician. More than two
million kids have gone through the program. Participants include Gustavo Dudamel, current music
director of Los Angeles Philarmonia, and many other successful musicians like Edicson Ruiz who at
age 17 became the youngest ever bass player in the Berlin Philarmonia! The success of the program
goes beyond star musicians. A study of the Inter- American Development Bank links participating in
the program with improvements in school attendance and declines in delinquency.
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culture is xed and children become adults. My objective is to characterise the dynamics of
traits.
The driving force of the dynamics is the possibility of reaching new sets of models through
the process of cultural change. In particular, children, by acquiring traits which are dierent
from those of their parents, open up dierent alternatives to their own (future) children,
alternatives that they themselves could not even contemplate or think of when they made
their choices. Consider for instance the choice of profession, and assume that there are only
three alternatives (variants) to choose from: farmer, medical doctor and mathematician.
Farmers are farmers from time immemorial when they live in complete isolation. But what
about if farmers' children become aware of the attractive possibility to becoming medical
doctors? Some children of farmers may move to the city and become doctors. Their children,
by growing in a doctor's environment, will be exposed to a wider array of models which
include not only doctors and (possibly) farmers but also mathematicians. The process of
cultural transmission will lead to a new distribution of professions and, in the long run,
some descendants of farmers will be mathematicians, some doctors and other farmers. The
actual proportions will depend on the attractiveness dierent children attach to the dierent
variants and on the way the sets of models are actually connected.
The main components of the model are the sets of cultural models dierent children are
exposed to and the values dierent children attach to the models in their set. I assume that
children's evaluations of cultural variants depend on the children's family as well as on the set
of available models. For instance, the Straddle technique's attractiveness in the high jump is
likely to be higher when only the Scissors-Jump is an alternative than when also the Fosbury
Flop exist in the set of models.2 The attractiveness of headscarfs and other religious signs,
dressing styles, languages...etc, may well depend on the competing models, the same way
that the attractiveness of a mobile telephone depends on the presence or not of an iPhone.
Smoking maybe better seen in some circles than in others, academics' children may nd more
glamour in the life of a researcher than in that of a football player while children from other
families may have a dierent rankings.
I show that the resulting dynamics can be written as a Markov chain. I can then charac-
terise the long distribution of cultural variants in the population, provided that the process
is aperiodic and irreducible. Irreducibility means, in my model, that some direct descendants
of individuals with variant i will have variant j, and this holds true for any pair of variants.
Since children can also be like their parents, the system is aperiodic. These two properties
guarantee that the resulting dynamic system has a unique stable long run distribution which
can be characterised using directed trees. More visible, more permanent and more attractive
variants are shown to have larger shares in the long run. In the special case in which all
children evaluate variants in the same way but are still exposed to dierent sets of models,
the long run proportion of each variant is proportional to the total value assigned to the own
set of models, and to the own merit and permanence, provided that copying is bidirectional.
This condition requires that if a farmer's child can become a doctor with positive probability,
2The model, though phrased in terms of biological parents and osprings, allows a wider inter-
pretation of cultural parents and cultural children, like a supervisor (belonging to a certain school of
thought) and his supervisee, a coach (with his techniques) and his trainee...
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then a doctor's child can become a farmer with positive, though not necessarily equal, proba-
bility. In this case if all variants happen to be equally attractive, those competing with more
variants, i.e those with larger set of models, will have larger shares. Increasing the number of
models does not necessarily lead to an increase in the long run share. A sucient condition
for this to be the case is that all variants be equally permanent.
The model rationalises why some groups may decide to cut o all relations with the
outside world in order to avoid extinction or impose strong penalties on those who leave the
community. This is optimal for communities with cultural variants which face competition
from more \attractive" ones. A well known example are the Amish of North America3 who
advocate a simple life style with very strict codes of behaviour which looks little attractive
in modern societies.4 These communities are a extreme example but examples abound of
groups which put enormous eorts into the preservation of their cultures when they enter in
competition with others. Catalans and Basques have managed to preserve their languages,
Jews, in spite of centuries of persecutions, have preserved many of their old traditions. The
model can also explain how some variants may easily spread, why English is the language of
science, why German and French are loosing ground as second languages in many countries,
why Brazil excels in football and India in IT.
The model diers from previous models on cultural transmission in several aspects. First,
all existing theoretical models (see Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2006)5 and Saez-Marti and
Sjogren (2008)) consider only dichotomous cultural traits, namely traits which have only
two variants while I consider an arbitrary, nite number of them. This makes possible the
study of an important aspect in the dynamics of culture: the introduction of new variants,
be it by cultural innovation or brought in by immigration. Second, previous models have no
role for role models, nor allow they for heterogeneity in the inuences beyond those of the
family in the rst stages of life. In particular, children acquire their culture either in the
family, via direct costly teaching or, if parent's eorts fail, from society. This second source
of cultural inuence is the same for all children, and is restricted to the parents' generation.
By incorporating inuences beyond the parents' cohort, I come closer to the modelling of
contemporary societies where outside inuences coming from other children, schools, public
gures, the media... are increasingly important. Heterogeneity is introduced by allowing that
children from dierent families be exposed to dierent sets of models, their choices being then
constrained by their limited available opportunities.
The model presented here in not one of social networks in which agents interact with
dierent sets of neighbours and inuence each other but a model in which dierent people
have access to dierent partitions of a given set of possibilities. It is the parents' culture
what determines which actual partition children have access to. Acquiring a dierent culture
3In 2000, according to some studies, there were 165,000 Old Order Amish in Canada and the
United States. In 2006 they were 227,000. They have an average of 6.8 children per family.
4For instance private use of cars is mostly banned because it would "quicken the pace of their
life, erase geographical limits, weaken social control, and eventually ruin their community." Amish
children follow formal education only up to eighth grade, further education is deemed a threat that
separates them from their parents, their parents' traditions and values.
5Bisin and Verdier (2006) reviews some of the most interesting applications of the theoretical model
in Bisin and Verdier (2000).
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implies moving to a dierent partition so that the ospring will have access to dierent choices.
The same that having English rather than French as a second language may inuence the
holiday destination and the food one gets acquainted with and ends up eating at home, a child
of a mathematician is exposed to opportunities which are dierent not only from those of a
farmer's child but also from those of his own child if he himself decides to be a doctor. This
process of jumping from one partition into another drives the inter generational transmission
of culture which I analyse in the paper.
The model I propose is silent on what determines the actual partition one falls in. I do
take them as given and analyse the implication for the long run distribution of culture as
well as the eect of changes in the partitions and of the introduction of new variants.
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section I introduce the basic model. In
section 3 I derive the general dynamics and obtain the long run distribution of cultural traits.
Section 4 analyses the case with equal evaluations and bidirectional copying and study its
implications for the long run distribution. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
I present an overlapping generation model with a Poisson birth and death process. Time is
discrete and each period is subdivided in two. At the beginning of each period the economy
is populated by a large number of adults. Each adult is characterised by a xed variant of
a cultural trait. The set of possible variants is nite and denoted by K = f1; 2; :::; kg; with
k  2: The cultural trait could be religion and the variants the possible religious denomina-
tions, it could be profession and the variants a list of alternatives including farmers, weavers,
engineers... At the beginning of the rst sub-period each adult has a child with probability
. During this rst sub-period the new born is educated in the family and through a process
of learning and imitation acquires a variant of the cultural trait. Children can only acquire
variants they see and since parents dier in their cultures, children from dierent families6
end up being dierent.
I assume that all children acquire the family variant but some variants are pushed more
forcefully than others or are more dicult to change, so that children dier in the probability
of actually sticking to the family culture. Let pi 2 (0; 1) denote the probability that a child
from family i does not consider revising his trait, i.e.; will be like his parents. Let p be the
k-dimensional vector which has pi as its i-th element. This vector summarises parents' rst
sub-period inuence.
In the second sub-period children are exposed to new models and can decide to revise the
family trait. Let M  K denote a set of models and let fi(M) be the probability that a child
who revises his trait and faces models in M copies variant i. We assume that fi(M)  0
whenever i 2 M and fi(M) = 0 when i =2 M so that children can not acquire variants they
are not aware of.
The set of models M  K includes peers but also other individuals like teachers, neigh-
bours, friends.., and people one is in no direct contact with but of whose existence and
6Since a family consists of a parent and a child, I use the terms parent and family interchangeably.
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achievements is aware of and can relate to. The child of a farmer in a remote village in the
Swiss Alps may not be aware of the existence of mathematicians or opera singers but may
well know of the existence of medical doctors and vets. The set of models is allowed to vary
across children from dierent families. After this second learning/imitation stage, culture is
denitively xed and children are adults with a xed culture which will determine the set of
models their own children will have access to.
In order to keep the population constant we assume, following Hauk and Saez Marti
(2002), that at the end of the period, (old) adults die with probability : The state of the
economy is described by the k-dimensional vector x(t) indicating the proportion of adults
having each of the variants at the beginning of period t.
I look for the steady state of the following system of dierence equations describing the
dynamics of the population distribution of cultural variants:
xi(t+ 1) = (1  )xi(t) + (pixi(t)+
kX
j=1
fi(M
j)(1  pj)xj(t)) i = 1; 2; :::; k (1)
where M j  K is the set of models of a j-child. The rst term on the RHS are the surviving
adults, the second are those children who acquired variant i and did not change it, and the
last term are those who revised their culture and acquired variant i.
In order to close the model I need to characterise children's choice of variants given their
set of cultural models. I assume that children attach some merit or attractiveness to each of
the models in their set of models. The evaluations may depend on the actual set the child
can observe and on the family one comes from. For instance the value of learning a foreign
language may depend on the existence or not of foreigners in one's environment. The value
given to Catalan or Basque relative to Castilian may depend on whether one's parents are
immigrant from other Spanish communities.
Let aij  0 be the attractiveness or merit of variant j for an i-child who faces models in
group M i and assume that aij = 0 for all j =2 M i so that children cannot assign values to
things of which existence they are not aware. Given set M i, the probability of copying trait
j is,
fj(M
i) =
aijP
k2K a
i
k
=
aijP
k2M i a
i
k
; (2)
so that more attractive variants are copied with higher probability.
In the next section I analyse the dynamics (1) in the most general case in which children
from dierent families may be confronted with dierent sets of models and may evaluate traits
dierently. In a later section I will analyse the special case in which all children evaluate traits
in the same way.
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3 The dynamics
The system of dierence equations (1) can be written as
x(t+ 1) = x(t) ; (3)
where   = [ij ] is a (k  k) matrix with entries
ij =

(1  pi)fj(M i) i 6= j
(1  ) + (pi + (1  pi)fi(M i)) j = i; (4)
and f is given by (2).
Since   is a stochastic matrix (all entries are non negative and all its row sums are unity)
our deterministic dynamic system is mathematically equivalent to a Markov chain and I can
apply standard results to characterise the long run distribution of variants in the population.
In particular if   is such that the process is aperiodic and irreducible there exist a unique
stationary distribution x? so that,
x? = x?  (5)
moreover,
lim
t!1x(t) = x
? (6)
for any initial distribution.
Aperiodicity is guaranteed by the fact that ii > 0, namely children are like their parents
with positive probability. Irreducibility means in our context that some descendants of i-
individuals are j-individuals after a nite number of generations. And this is true for any i
and any j. Consider for instance our example with the three professions: medical doctors,
mathematicians and farmers, to be numbered 1, 2 and 3, respectively. Assume that M1 =
f1; 2; 3g, M2 = f1; 2g and M3 = f1; 3g, so that all children know about the profession of
their parents, but only the doctors' children are aware of all other professions. Farmers'
children know about doctors and so do the mathematicians' but they ignore each other. The
resulting system is irreducible because some children of the mathematicians become doctors
and since some children of doctors become farmers, some mathematicians will have farmers
as grandparents. Similarly some grandchildren of farmers will be mathematicians because
their parents were doctors and some of the doctors' parents are farmers. If insteadM3 = f3g,
so that farmers' children think being farmers is their only alternative, the system is reducible
and farmers are farmers and will always be farmers.
Proposition 1 characterises the unique long run distribution of variants and shows that
it depends on the probability of revision, on the total attractiveness of the peer group and
on how connected these groups are. I use a Lemma from Freidlin and Wentzel (1984, lemma
3.1) which uses a particular type of directed graphs, z-trees, to characterised the long run
distribution of aperiodic irreducible nite state Markov chains. Intuitively a z-tree indicates
how a state z 2 K of a nite Markov chain (a variant in our application) can be reached from
any other state without passing through any state more than once. Formally, a z-tree is a
collection of arrows between elements of K such that i) every element i 2 Kj fzg is the origin
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of one and only one arrow that leads to some other state j 2 K, ii) there is a unique path
starting in i that leads to z, and iii) there are no close loops. Figures 1 shows all possible
3-trees (farmer-trees) for the three-variant example.
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 1: All possible 3-trees
Freidlin and Wentzel (1984) associate to the arrow linking i with j, to be denoted (i! j),
the probability ij that the transition occurs, to each z-tree the product of the probabilities
of all its arrows and to each state z 2 K the sum of all the numbers assigned to all its z-trees.
Let qz be the resulting number,
qz =
X
h2Tz
Y
i!j2h
ij (7)
where Tz is the set of all z-trees and h is a z-tree. Note that some elements in the sum above
may be zero since some of the ij 's could be zero. If the process is irreducible qz is positive
since any state can be reached from any other in a nite number of steps.
In the 3 variant case (see Figure 1) q3 = 1223 + 2113 + 1323, where ij is the
probability that j is reached from i in one step. In the three profession example the only
3-tree with a positive value is (b) since 1 2 M2 and 3 2 M1 so that both 21 and 13 are
positive. The other two trees, (a) and (c), have an arrow linking 2 and 3, and this direct
transition happens with probability 0 since the son of a mathematician cannot become a
farmer (3 =2M2) and hence 23 = 0. In this case q3 = 2113.
Aperiodicity and irreducibility guarantee the existence of a unique stationary distribution
x?. Let q be the k-dimensional vector which has qi as its i-th element. Freidlin and Wentzel
(1984, chapter 6, Lemma 3.1) prove the following,
LEMMA 1. The vector x? is proportional to q.
I can now state my main result:
PROPOSITION 1. Assume (2) and that the resulting Markov process is irreducible. Then,
x?i =
(
P
h2Ti
Q
k!j2h a
k
j )(1  pi) 1(
P
k2M i a
i
k)Pk
j=1(
P
h2Tj
Q
k!s2h aks)(1  pj) 1(
P
k2Mj a
j
k)
i = 1; 2; :::; k:: (8)
Proof. It follows from Freidlin and Wentzell (1984) that
x?i =
qiP
k2K qk
: (9)
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Substituting ij in (7) we obtain that
qz =
Q
k 6=z(1  pk)Q
k 6=z(
P
i2Mk a
k
i )
X
h2Tz
Y
i!j2h
aij : (10)
Plugging (10) in (9) and multiplying and dividing by
Q
k2K(1   pj) 1(
Q
k2K
P
k2Mj a
j
k)
delivers (8). Q.E.D.
The ratio P
h2Ti
Q
k!j2h a
k
j
1  pi (11)
captures the tness of the variant. This depends on i) how attractive, from the point of view
of the potential adopters, and how connected it is and on ii) how easily it can be changed.
Since all i-trees end in variant i, it has to be the case that each of the terms in the
numerator contain at least one aji for j 6= i, so that variants which look very unattractive
to those considering its adoption, will have lower shares. Increases in the attractiveness
of the own variant, as well as decreases in the probability revising the variant, increase
unambiguously the long run shares.
Continuing with the example developed above, consider the example of the isolated com-
munity of farmers (M3 = f3g) whose children learn, at a certain point in time, about
the attractive possibility to becoming medical doctors. Their set of models becomes larger
(M3 = f1; 3g) and some farmers' children become doctors. Since doctors have access to a
larger world, M1 = f1; 2; 3g, and the prospect of becoming a mathematician is also attractive
for them, some of the doctors' children become mathematicians, others farmers and some keep
on being doctors. Some mathematicians' children become also doctors since M2 = f1; 2g.
After some time a new stationary distribution is reached with mathematicians, doctors and
farmers, all having farmers in their family trees. Figure 2 below illustrates the dynamics.
Initially all are farmers (circles). At t = 2 their set of models become larger and some
farmer's children become active doctors at t = 3 (stars). At t = 4 some doctors' children
become mathematicians (diamonds). Note that in this example it is not the variant which is
more connected the one which has a larger long-run share but the one which is most preferred
(mathematicians) by those who are more connected (the doctors).
I have not ruled out the possibility that children, when deciding to change their culture
consider also their own variant. For this to be the case aii should be positive. If some children
react against their family and want to be dierent then aii = 0 for those children, and the
long run shares as given by (8) would be smaller.
I analyse next the case in which all children evaluate variants in the same way.
4 Equal evaluations
Assume now that all children evaluate the variants equally, so that the merits are independent
of the actual sets of models, namely aji = ai for all j. The following proposition shows that
when a simple structure is introduced in the way the sets of models are connected, the actual
9
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Figure 2: My ancestors were farmers.
connections cease to be important. The condition requires copying to be bi-directional so
that if a child of type i can acquire trait j, then a j-child can acquire trait i. This assumption
is reasonable when the set of models are the peers one interact with, so that observation is
bidirectional. Schooling and interactions may help homogenise the evaluations of existing
traits. In the proposition I still allow for dierences in the set of models.
PROPOSITION 2. Assume aji = ai for all j, i 2 M j if and only if j 2 M i, and that the
process dened by (3) is irreducible, then
x?i =
ai(1  pi) 1
P
k2M i akPk
j=1 aj(1  pj) 1
P
k2Mj ak
i = 1; 2; :::; k: (12)
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Proof. We show rst that x?i pi +
P
j x
?
j (1  pj)fi(M j) = x?i ,
ai(1  pi) 1
P
k2M i akPk
j=1 aj(1  pj) 1
P
k2Mj ak
pi
+
X
l2M i
al(1  pl) 1
P
k2M l akPk
j=1 aj(1  pj) 1
P
k2Mj ak
(1  pl)aiP
k2M l ak
=
ai(1  pi) 1
P
k2M i akPk
j=1 aj(1  pj) 1
P
k2Mj ak
pi
+
X
l2M i
alaiPk
j=1 aj(1  pj) 1
P
k2Mj ak
=
ai(1  pi) 1
P
k2M i akPk
j=1 aj(1  pj) 1
P
k2Mj ak
:
Substituting xi(t) in (1) by x
?
i gives xi(t + 1) = x
?
i . Uniqueness follows from the ergodicity
of the Markov chain. Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 is a particular case of Proposition 1. Two restrictions have been introduced:
i) all children evaluate variants in the same way and ii) imitation has to be bidirectional.
None of these assumptions was needed to obtain the long run distribution characterised in
Proposition 1. Curiously enough these two assumptions imply that the long run distribution
does not depend on the actual set of directed trees, as can be seen by comparing (12) and
(8).
Since the long run distribution is unique, I can, by some reverse engineering, obtain an
expression for the vector q (see equation (7)). Direct comparison of (12) and (8) leads toX
h2Ti
Y
j!s2h
ajs = aiQ(Ti) i = 1; 2; :::; k; (13)
where Q(Ti) is a constant which depends on the set of i-trees. It has to be necessarily the
case that Q(Ti) = Q(T ) for all i, since Q(Ti) cancels out when ratios are taken to obtain xi
using q (see equation (9)). I can now write the expression for qi
qi = aiQ(T ))
Q
k 6=i(1  pk)Q
k 6=i(
P
s2Mk as)
i = 1; 2; ::; k: (14)
Note that, by construction, changes in M i do not have any eect on qi, provided that all
other sets of models remain unchanged. Expanding M i will have an eect on all other q's,
by increasing the number of possible directed trees and changing the probabilities of the
transitions. The share of i will fall in equilibrium since we open a path out of i without
opening one heading towards i. The same is not true if changes in M i are accompanied by
changes in other sets. The result of Proposition 2 is obtained under the assumption that if
one element, let us say j, is added to M i, then the element i has to be added to M j . By
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expanding M i we increase the probability that a child of an i-parent is not like his parent,
but at the same time we make positive the probability that the children of j-parents become
i, and change the probabilities that they acquire any of the other traits in M j . It happens
that these changes aect all the q's in the same manner, so that the eect on the long run
distribution of the new constant Q(T 0) will, again, cancel out. All the eect on the long run
distribution comes from the changes in the total values of the sets M i and M j , which jointly
with the p's aect the probabilities of transition.
The following corollary gives the condition needed for an expansion of the set of models
to result in the increase of the long run share of a variant. Assume that initially i =2M j and
j =2M i and that the economy is in its long run equilibrium x?i . In a certain moment in time
M i expands to include j (and as a result M j to include i). The new sets to be considered are
M^ i = M i
Sfjg, M^ j = M j Sfig and M^ s = M s for all s 6= i; j. We show that heterogeneity
in the p's is needed in order to have the possibility that the equilibrium share of i decreases.
COROLLARY 1. Assume that the conditions of proposition 2 hold. Including element j
in M i and i in M j increases the equilibrium share of i whenX
s2Kjfi;jg
as
P
k2Ms ak
1  ps >
ai
P
k2M i ak   aj
P
k2Mj ak
1  pj (15)
This condition always holds true if ps = p for all s 2 K.
Proof. We denote by x? and x^? the corresponding long run shares as given by (12),
x^?i =
ai
1 pi
P
k2M^ i akP
s2K
as
1 ps
P
k2M^s ak
=
ai
1 pi
P
k2M i ak +
aiaj
1 piP
s2K
as
1 ps
P
k2Ms ak +
aiaj
1 pi +
aiaj
1 pj
(16)
x?i =
ai
1 pi
P
k2M i akP
s2K
as
1 ps
P
k2Ms ak
: (17)
x^?i   x?i is positive whenever
aiaj
1  pi
X
s2K
as
1  ps
X
k2Ms
ak > (
ai
1  pi
X
k2M i
ak)(
aiaj
1  pi +
aiaj
1  pj ): (18)
Rearranging (18) we obtain (15).
When ps = p for all s (15) simplies toX
s2Kjfig
as
X
k2Ms
ak   ai
X
k2M i
ak: (19)
Since each of the elements of the second term has a identical counterpart in the rst term
(by the bidirectional assumption) (19) is always positive.
Q.E.D.
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To understand this result it is useful to see which conditions other than the heterogeneity
in the elements of p, lead to a decrease in x?i . A necessary condition for (15) to be violated
is that
ai
X
k2M i
ak > aj
X
k2Mj
ak: (20)
This will be the case if j and/or the models in its set are few and unattractive relative to
variant i and the models in its set. If condition (20) is satised, (15) will be more easily
violated if pj is large.
It is worth noting that: i) at least one of the two variants which open a new contact
will increase its share and ii) all other variants will experience a decline in their equilibrium
shares. It can easily be seen from (15) that if i decreases its share, then the share of j has
to increase, it is possible, though, that both increase. Since M^ s = M s for all s 6= i; j it is
always that case that the share of s decreases,
x^?s =
as
1 ps
P
k2Ms akP
g2K
ag
1 pg
P
k2Mg ak +
aiaj
1 pi +
aiaj
1 pj
<
as
1 ps
P
k2Ms akP
g2K
ag
1 pg
P
k2Mg ak
= x?s: (21)
Opening up a contact with unattractive, relatively isolated and dicult to change variants
may lead to a decline in the equilibrium value of all the variants but the unattractive one.
This could explain why unattractive variants like drug use, or membership in some (religious)
sects do not disappear but increase their shares when entering in contact with other groups.
The few new adepts are locked in.
To isolate further the role of p, assume that as = a for all s, so that we can abstract from
dierences in attractiveness. In this case
x?i =
ni(1  pi) 1P
j2K nj(1  pj) 1
i = 1; 2; :::; k; (22)
where nj denotes the number of elements in M
j , j = 1; 2; :::; k: Condition (15) simplies toX
s2Kjfi;jg
ns
1  ps >
ni   nj
1  pj : (23)
so that the share of i will always increase whenever nj  ni or, if this is not the case, when
pj is small enough.
I nally characterise the long run distribution when all sets of models are identical. This
could be the case if all children attend similar schools and have access to the same information
about possibilities.
COROLLARY 2. Assume that the conditions of proposition 2 hold, and that M i = K for
all i, then
x?i =
ai(1  pi) 1P
j2M aj(1  pj) 1
i = 1; 2; ::; k: (24)
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Once dierences in information about the available opportunities disappear, those variants
which have the higher ratio
ai
1  pi (25)
will have larger shares in the long run. High ratios are associated with variants which are
very permanent and/or very attractive. This can explain fashions, easy to change and easily
outmoded by a new variant coming along every six months, as well as the survival of bad
habits which though unattractive are dicult to change.
5 Conclusion
Through the paper I have assumed that the valuations given to the dierent variants depend
on which variants are actually available. The theory predicts that innovations which render
all existing ones inferior and eventually useless, will take over the whole population. The
channel through which cultural innovations spread are young agents who are exposed to the
novelty and for whom it is neither too late nor too dicult to change. Consider for instance
the Fosbury Flop, a cultural innovation that changed the high jump for ever at the 1968
Mexico City Olympic Games. In those Games Fosbury, the only one using the technique,
established a new world record and won the gold medal. In the following games (Munich
1972) already 28 out of 40 competitors used the four year old technique. Four years later, in
Moscow 1980, 13 out of 16 nalists jumped using the op. Nowadays it is the standard.
As the Fosbury example illustrates, changes in the relative attractiveness of variants may
have long lasting eects. Those changes are not necessarily brought about by the introduction
of a new variant but can be the result of policy interventions or the product of new available
information. An obvious example is smoking where public awareness of its dangers has had
dramatic eects on its attractiveness and consequently on its spread. Yet, the awareness of
the risks associated with smoking diers across groups and so do smoking rates. Less obvious
examples include information campaigns aiming at changing attitudes. As Hauk and Saez
Marti (2002) document, part of the success of the anti-corruption campaign in Hong-Kong in
the 60's and 70's can be attributed to the enormous eorts which were devoted to changing
children's views about corruption by exposing them to new and better models they could feel
identied with (see Klitgaard (1988)).
The model presented here is a statistical model in which parents and children behaviour
is captured by some xed parameters. I take as a primitive that some traits are pushed more
strongly than others or are more dicult to change, that children dier in the amount of
information they have about alternatives, and that their choice is driven by some evaluation
guided by the comparison of the currently available models. This model is a rst step to
understanding the dynamics of culture and the importance of models.
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